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I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act"),' the most significant revision of federal
communications law since the adoption of the
Communications Act of 1934 (as amended, the
"Communications Act"),2 addresses a broad range
of communications issues, including the areas of
common carrier, broadcast, and cable regula-
tion.3
The stated goals of the 1996 Act are "to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for Ameri-
can telecommunications consumers" and to "en-
courage the rapid deployment of new telecommu-
nications technologies." 4 Congress envisioned
that these goals would be achieved through mar-
ketplace competition. 5 Accordingly, the 1996 Act
* The author is an associate in the Communications and
Technology Group of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison or any
other person or entity. The author wishes to thank Professor
Ira C. Lupu of The George Washington University Law
School, who provided very useful and intelligent comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
3 The 1996 Act includes seven titles, three of which bear
noting here. Title I addresses common carriers, Title 1I ad-
dresses broadcast services and Title III addresses cable serv-
ices. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
4 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56.
5 See id. Many telecommunications services have histori-
cally been provided by entrenched monopolists. For exam-
ple, in most parts of the country residential customers are
able to obtain telephony services from only a single incum-
bent local exchange carrier such as Bell Atlantic. Basic
microeconomic theory provides that monopolists will exer-
cise their monopoly power by reducing output and increas-
ing prices. By adopting the 1996 Act, Congress sought to re-
created new opportunities for businesses to enter
markets for providing telecommunications serv-
ices. 6
In formulating the 1996 Act's common carrier
provisions, 7 Congress recognized the significant
competitive advantages of incumbent local ex-
change carriers ("ILECs") and sought to reduce
these advantages by imposing substantive obliga-
tions on all ILECs.8 One of the most important of
these obligations is the duty of mandatory inter-
connection which the 1996 Act established by ad-
ding section 251 to the Communications Act.9
Under this section, an ILEC must physically con-
nect its telecommunications network with the net-
work of any other telecommunications carrier
who so requests.' The obligation of mandatory
duce these effects by promoting competition. See HENK
BRANDS & EvAiN T. LEO, THE Lxw AND REGULATION OF TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS 12-30, 369-79 (1999).
6 See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 61-80, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261.
7 See id.
8 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
9 See id.
10 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a), 251 (c)(2). See also BRANDS &
LEO, supra note 5, at 387-88.
"In the FCC's terminology, interconnection does not refer
to the same thing as transport and termination ... [inter-
connection] refers to arrangements needed to create
the physical interconnection of networks ... Transport
and termination, on the other hand, refers to the actual
exchange of telephone traffic between interconnect[ed]
networks."
Id. Interconnection facilitates the seamless transport of tele-
communications traffic between networks. See id. Lacking in-
terconnection, telecommunications carriers seeking to com-
pete against ILECs would be at a severe competitive
disadvantage because consumers would strongly prefer the
vastly superior connectivity of the ILECs' existing networks.
The value of a network increases as more locations are inter-
connected by the network; in the field of economics, this
phenomenon is known as "network externalities." Id. at
19-20. An insurgent initially has very few interconnected lo-
cations and thus is at a severe competitive disadvantage as
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interconnection promotes the goals of the 1996
Act, including the goal of competition, by estab-
lishing an enforceable mechanism to ensure that
non-incumbent telecommunications carriers will
not be excluded from local markets.''
Although Congress mandated interconnection
under the 1996 Act, it realized that ILECs would
have little or no financial incentive to provide in-
terconnection to requesting carriers on terms that
are just and reasonable. Therefore, the 1996 Act
also added section 252 to the Communications
Act of 1934. 12Section 252 specifies the procedure
for developing interconnection agreements and
delegates the duty to monitor the implementation
of the agreements to state commissions.' Where
the parties to a proposed agreement are unable to
agree on specific terms, the state commission's
role is under section 252 is to resolve the dis-
pute' 4 and approve or reject the final settlement
of the parties. '5
If a party is aggrieved by the state commission's
decision, the aggrieved party is expressly author-
ized to bring suit in federal district court to deter-
mine whether the decision is consistent with sec-
tions 251 and 252.1 The state courts, however,
are denied jurisdiction over interconnection dis-
putes.' 7 The exclusive federal judicial review of
state commission decisions under sections 251
and 252 immediately reveals potential conflict
with the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, 18
which generally bars a federal court from hearing
compared to a carrier that has a vast network of intercon-
nected locations. See id. at 20. Interconnection between
ILECs and other telecommunications carriers is facilitated by
private contracts known as interconnection agreements. See
id.
I ' See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 5, at 379-90 (quoting at
length In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996)).
12 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101, 47 U.S.C.
§ 252 (1994 & Supp. Il1 1997).
I3 See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(41) (defining "state
commission").
14 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b).
15 See 47 U.S.C.§ 252(e).
16 See 47 U.S.C.§ 252(e) (6).
17 See 47 U.S.C.§ 252(e) (4).
18 As sovereigns, states are immune from certain types of
suits. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ("The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."). See generally Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
19 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Semi-
suits against state governments.' 9 Under this doc-
trine, a state commission defendant in a section
251/252 suit can seek dismissal of the federal
suit.2 0' With a dismissed suit in federal court and
no recourse in the state courts because of the ex-
press denial of state court jurisdiction, the ag-
grieved parties conceivably could be left with no
method for obtaining relief.
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity is
closely intertwined with the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which provides that "[t] he judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."'2 However, the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity extends well beyond the plain
text of the Eleventh Amendment to encompass,
inter alia, suits against states initiated by its own
citizens 22 or suits brought in state court pursuant
to federal causes of action. 23 There is general
agreement that the limitations imposed by the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity are equally
applicable to agencies of state government. 24
It is important to note that at the time the 1996
Act was adopted it was believed that the Com-
merce Clause empowered Congress to "abrogate"
state sovereign immunity by establishing a statu-
tory cause of action against the states enforceable
in federal court pursuant to its regulatory author-
ity over interstate commerce.2 5 However, in Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996);
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu-
cation Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
2( Dismissal is based on lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 367-419
(1994) (providing an overview of the doctrine of state sover-
eign immunity). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
21 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
22 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1; Employees of
the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
23 See generally Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
24 See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. 651; College Savings, 527 U.S.
666. In each of these cases, the Court assumed without ques-
tion that a state agency may invoke the state sovereign immu-
nity defense.
25 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44. There is no question
that Congress adopted section 252 pursuant to its Interstate
Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of
the S. Cent. States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 43 F.
Supp. 2d 593, 599 (M.D. La. 1999) ("Clearly, the Commerce
Clause is the source of congressional power which was relied
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note Tribe of Florida v. Florida,26 a case decided soon
after the adoption of the 1996 Act, the Supreme
Court significantly curtailed the abrogation doc-
trine. The Court held that the Commerce Clause
does not empower Congress to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity.2 7 .
It is not surprising in light of Seminole Tribe that
state commission defendants in section 251/252
suits have attempted to invoke state sovereign im-
munity.2 8 Because Seminole Tribe forecloses the
possibility of invoking the abrogation doctrine as
a response to the state sovereign immunity de-
fense in Section 252 litigation,29 plaintiffs instead
have attempted to invoke the doctrines of express
upon to enact the Telecommunications Act of 1996... Be-
cause the Supreme Court [in Seminole Tribe] has clearly
spelled out that the Commerce Clause grants no such [abro-
gation] power to the Congress, it is apparent that it has ex-
ceeded its constitutional authority."); MCI Telecomm. Corp.
v. BellSouth Telecomm., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (E.D. Ky.
1998) (stating that the "[1996] Act was passed pursuant to
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause,
and based on Seminole Tribe ... Congress cannot use the
Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's power"). See also
Cynthia L. Bauerly, Balancing the Scales: The 1996 Telecommuni-
cations Act and Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 50 Fed. Comm.
L.J. 399, 407 (1998) (concluding that because the 1996 Act
was passed pursuant to Congress's Interstate Commerce
Clause power, section 252 could not possibly abrogate state
sovereign immunity).
26 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
27 See id. at 57-73 (questioning the legitimacy of a
number of federal statutes that provide causes of action
against the states); see also Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver after
Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793, 793 (1998) ("legislation
governing such diverse areas as the environment, intellectual
property, bankruptcy, antitrust, labor relations, telecommu-
nications, civil rights, veteran's affairs, and Native American
affairs").
28 See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 1999), amended by 183 F.3d
558, and reh'g granted, 183 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 1999); Illinois
Bell Telephone Co. v. Worldcom Technologies, Inc., 179
F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999), affd, 1998 WL 419493 (N.D. III. Jul.
23, 1998); Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Climax Tele-
phone Co., 186 F.3d 726 (6th Cir.1999), opinion withdrawn by
court on Jan. 10, 2000; amended opinion reported at - F.3d __,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 585 Uan. 18, 2000).; AT&T Communi-
cations v. BellSouth, 43 F. Supp. 2d 593 (granting dismissal);
Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wisconsin, 57
F. Supp. 2d 710 (granting dismissal) [hereinafter Wisconsin
Bell 11]; Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100
(S.D. Ind. 1998) (denying dismissal); Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v.
Smithville Tel. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (de-
nying dismissal); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. BellSouth
Telecomm., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (denying dis-
missal); Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Michigan,
Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 817 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (denying dismis-
sal); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of Utah, 991 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Utah 1998) (denying dismis-
sal); Illinois Bell Tel. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., No. 98-C-
waiver 30 and Ex parte Young' to circumvent state
sovereign immunity. 32
Suits to enforce the requirements of sections
251 and 252 have focused almost exclusively on
constructive waiver. Courts considering the viabil-
ity of constructive waiver in the context of such
suits have explicitly or implicitly concluded that it
survives Seminole Tribe and that a state commission
can constructively waive state sovereign immunity
by participating in the section 251/252 regulatory
scheme. 33 However, the legitimacy of this conclu-
sion has been called into question by the
Supreme Court's 1999 decision in College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postseconday Education Ex-
1925, 1998 WL 547278 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1998) (denying dis-
missal); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. TCG Oregon, 35
F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Or. 1998) (denying dismissal); U.S.
West Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 1221 (D. Or. 1998) (denying dismissal); U.S. West
Communications, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365
(W.D. Wash. 1997) (denying dismissal); U.S. West Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Reinbold, No. Civ. A1-97-25, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22606, 1997 WL 1179956 (D. N.D. Jul. 28, 1997) (de-
nying dismissal).
29 See, e.g., AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth, 43 F. Supp.
2d at 599 ("Because the Supreme Court [in Seminole Tribe]
has clearly spelled out that the Commerce Clause grants no
such [abrogation] power to the Congress, it is apparent that
it has exceeded its constitutional authority" by enacting sec-
tion 252(e) (6)); MCI v. Bellsouth., 9 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (stat-
ing that the "[1996] Act was passed pursuant to Congress's
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, and based
on Seminole Tribe . . . Congress cannot use the Commerce
Clause to abrogate a state's power"). See also Bauerly, supra
note 25, at 407 (concluding that, because the 1996 Act was
passed pursuant to Congress's Interstate Commerce Clause
power, section 252 could not possibly abrogate state sover-
eign immunity).
30 Under the doctrine of waiver, a state may not invoke
the state sovereign immunity defense if it has waived its sover-
eign immunity. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 407;
Courts historically have recognized that waiver may be ex-
press or constructive. See, e.g., Port Auth. Trans-Hudson v.
Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (finding express waiver); Parden
v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184
(1964) (finding constructive waiver), overruled by College Sav-
ings, 527 U.S. 666.
31 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
32 See, e.g., Illinois Bell v. Worldcom, 179 F.3d 566; MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 183 F.3d 558; Indi-
ana Bell v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100; Indiana Bell v.
Smithville Tel. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 628; MCI v. Bellsouth., 9 F.
Supp. 2d 766; Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. MI'S Intelenet, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 817; U.S. West v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 991 F.
Supp. 1299; Illinois Bell Tel. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., No.
98-C-1925, 1998 WL 547278 (N.D. Ill. 1998); U.S. West v. TCG
Oregon, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1237; U.S. West v. MPS Intelenet, 35 F.
Supp. 2d 1221; U.S. West v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365;
U.S. West v. Reinbold, supra note 28.
33 See id.
20001
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
pense Board,3 4 which expressly repudiates the con-
structive waiver doctrine.3 5
This article argues that Seminole Tribe and College
Savings render the doctrine of Ex parte Young the
only viable mechanism available to plaintiffs to
circumvent the state sovereign immunity defense
in suits under sections 251 and 252.36 After reach-
ing this conclusion, a court should dismiss the
state commission and grant only injunctive relief
against the state commission's officers. Upon dis-
missal of the state commission, however, section
252 imposes upon the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") an express statutory duty to
preempt the state commission's participation
under sections 251 and 252 and assume the re-
sponsibilities of the state commission.3 7 Once the
FCC preempts the state commission, section 252
provides that the "exclusive" remedies available
are a proceeding by the FCC and judicial review
of the FCC's actions.38 Therefore, consistent with
Seminole Tribe, injunctive relief previously available
under Ex parte Young is no longer an option. 39 In-
deed, injunctive relief against the state commis-
sion's officers should be unnecessary because the
FCC has assumed the responsibilities of the state
commission.
This article is structured as follows: Part II of
this article briefly describes the regulatory frame-
work of sections 251 and 252 with an overview of
both the substantive and procedural require-
ments imposed by those sections. Part III of this
article discusses the doctrine of abrogation and,
in particular, the abrogation-related aspects of the
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe. Part IV argues
that state commissions do not waive their sover-
eign immunity. In particular, in light of College
Savings, the constructive waiver doctrine cannot
be invoked to circumvent the state sovereign im-
munity defense. Part V argues that Ex parte Young
suits may be used to circumvent the state sover-
34 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
35 See id. at 527 U.S. 666, 119 S.Ct. at 2221 (noting that "a
State's express waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivo-
cal")
36 See infra Parts III, IV, V.
37 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6).
38 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (5).
39 See generally Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
40 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
41 See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
42 The discussion herein is merely intended to provide a
brief overview of the substantive framework imposed by sec-
tion 251. For a more comprehensive understanding of this
framework, the reader should review the FCC's implement-
eign immunity defense to enforce the require-
ments of sections 251 and 252, but only during
the interim period between dismissal of the state
commission and the FCC's subsequent preemp-
tion order. The conclusion combines these and
other observations to present a simple and
straightforward perspective on how litigation to
enforce the requirements of sections 251 and 252
should proceed.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
FRAMEWORK IN SECTIONS 251 AND 252
The establishment and regulation of intercon-
nection agreements has two facets: The substan-
tive content of interconnection agreements is pro-
vided in section 25140 and the procedural
mechanisms for developing interconnection
agreements is provided in section 252.41
A. Substantive Framework Imposed By Section
251
Section 251 establishes substantive interconnec-
tion obligations; some apply to all carriers, others
vary according to the carriers' status as an incum-
bent or non-incumbent carrier. 42 Section 251 (a),
applicable to all carriers, imposes interconnection
obligations on all "telecommunications carriers"
including "local exchange carriers" ("LECs") and
"incumbent local exchange carriers" ("ILECs").43
Section 251(b) imposes obligations on all LECs,
including ILECs;44 and section 251(c) imposes
obligations particular only to ILECs.45
All telecommunications carriers are required
under section 251 (a) to interconnect with the fa-
cilities and equipment of other telecommunica-
tions carriers and are prohibited from installing
network features, functions or capabilities that do
not comply with the guidelines and standards of
ing regulations and associated FCC orders and judicial opin-
ions. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1998). See also In re Implementation
of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499
(1996), and modified by 11 FCC Rcd. 13042 (1996), partially
vacated, Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
1997), and rev'd in part, AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525
U.S. 366 (1999). Additional background on sections 251 and
252 can be found in HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw 455-537 (2d ed. 1999).
43 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a). The term "incumbent local ex-
change carrier" is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 251(h).
44 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b).
45 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c).
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the Communications Act. 46 All LECs are required
under section 251 (b) to provide telecommunica-
tions resale capacity, number portability, 47 dialing
parity,48 access to rights-of-way and reciprocal
compensation arrangements for the transport and
termination of telecommunications traffic. 49
These obligations cover a variety of issues that
arise during interconnection negotiations and il-
lustrate the economic incentives for litigation. For
example, arrangements established to compen-
sate interconnecting carriers for the amount of
telecommunications traffic they terminate often
become unbalanced, shifting the economic bur-
den onto the disadvantaged interconnecting car-
rier.50 Consequently, setting rates is an essential
but contentious part of establishing a viable inter-
connection agreement.
Section 251(c) imposes obligations exclusive to
ILECs, including six basic duties designed to pro-
mote competition. 51 First, all ILECs must negoti-
ate in good faith while adhering to the procedural
requirements in section 252.52 Second, all ILECs
must provide interconnection for the transmis-
sion of telecommunications services at any techni-
cally feasible point within its network on a non-
discriminatory basis. 53 Third, all ILECs must pro-
vide to any requesting telecommunications carrier
access to unbundled network elements on a non-
discriminatory basis and on favorable terms.54
Fourth, all ILECs must offer resale capacity on
favorable terms. 55 Fifth, all ILECs must provide
reasonable notice of network changes that would
affect transmission and related services. 56 Finally,
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a).
47 See BRANDS & LEo, supra note 5, at 377 (describing
number portability as allowing a customer to "keep her
phone number if she changes carriers."); see also 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(46) (defining the term "number portability").
48 See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 5, at 377 (defining dial-
ing parity as a policy that ensures "that a CLEC's customer
does not have to dial more digits than an ILEC's customer.");
see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(15) (defining the term "dialing par-
ity").
49 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b).
50 See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 5, at 387-88. (noting
that compensation typically occurs when one carrier termi-
nates the telecommunications traffic originated by another
carrier). Disputes can arise regarding the structure of the
compensation rate, which may depend upon the type and
amount of telecommunications traffic involved. See id; see also
Illinois Bell v. Worldcom, 179 F.3d 566 (providing a specific ex-
ample of a dispute involving reciprocal compensation).
51 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c).
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (1).
53 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (2).
all ILECs must provide opportunities for physical
or virtual collocation of interconnection equip-
ment and access to unbundled network elements
at the ILEC's premises.
57
The remaining subsections in section 251 grant
the FCC authority to administer these require-
ments. This includes the authority to adopt imple-
menting regulations.58 Section 251(f) establishes
some exemptions and suspensions for rural tele-
communications carriers. 59
B. The Section 252 Procedural Framework
Section 252 provides the procedural framework
for establishing section 251 interconnection
agreements. The implications of a viable agree-
ment are significant because section 252(i) re-
quires LECs, including ILECs, to make available
to all carriers interconnection, service, and net-
work elements under the same terms and condi-
tions as offered to any carrier under any agree-
ment to which it is a party.6 °
Carriers may enter into interconnection agree-
ments either through voluntary negotiations or by
petitioning a state commission to mediate or arbi-
trate disputes. 6' Section 252 does not specify the
state commission's mediation duties. However,
section 252(c) identifies three broad primary re-
sponsibilities: (1) to ensure that resolution of is-
sues is consistent with section 251 and FCC rules;
(2) to establish rates; and (3) to establish a time
schedule for meeting applicable terms and condi-
tions of the agreement.6 2
54 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (3).
55 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (4).
56 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (5).
57 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (6).
58 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)-(e). The FCC's imple-
menting regulations appear in 47 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1998).
59 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(f).
60 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(i). See also 47 C.F.R. § 51.809
(1998) (implementing § 252(i)). See also, e.g., GTE North,
Inc. v. McCarty, 978 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (not-
ing that the "practical effect of §252(i) is to prohibit incum-
bent carriers from exercising a preference for one carrier
over another").
61 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)-(b). In California, the "majority
of interconnection agreements . . . have been negotiated
without [state commission] intervention." James M. Tobin
and Mary E. Wand, Competition in Local Telephone Services: Cali-
fornia's Experience in Implementation of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 791, 804 (1998). It is likely that
the experiences of other states have been similar.
62 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1994 & Supp. Il 1997).
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Regardless of how an agreement is reached, the
parties are required to submit the agreement to
the state commission for review.6 3 This review is
limited to whether the interconnection agree-
ment fulfills the requirements of section 251 and
252.64 A state commission has the power to reject
an agreement adopted by voluntary negotiation
only if the agreement discriminates against third
party carriers or is not in the public interest.65
Agreements adopted by arbitration can be re-
jected by the state commission only if the agree-
ment violates section 251, including implement-
ing regulations, or violates pricing standards set
forth in section 252(d).66 A state is not prevented
by section 252(e) (3) from applying other state law
in its review of agreements, "including requiring
compliance with intrastate telecommunications
service quality standards or requirements." 6 7
Section 252 explicitly authorizes state commis-
sions to participate in the review process, however
they are not required to do so. Section 252(e) (5)
provides,
If a State commission fails to act to carry out its respon-
sibility under this section in any proceeding or other
matter under this section, then the Commission shall
issue an order preempting the State commission's juris-
diction of that proceeding or matter within 90 days af-
ter being notified (or taking notice) of such failure,
and shall assume the responsibility of the State commis-
sion under this section with respect to the proceeding
or matter and act for the State commission.68
63 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (1).
64 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6).
65 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (2) (A).
66 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (2) (B).
67 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (3).
68 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5); see also 47 C.F.R. § 51.801
(1998).
69 See, e.g., U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Reinbold, supra
note 28, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22606 at *14, 1997 WL
1179956 at *4. (" '[B]y overwhelming implication' . . . this
language places no obligation upon the State agency to par-
ticipate in the [review] process"). See also MCI v. Illinois Com-
merce Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315, 323 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"the [1996] Act provides state commissions with a realistic
and genuine choice whether to involve themselves in the reg-
ulatory process when asked to arbitrate and approve inter-
connection agreements, or whether to let the FCC assume
those functions."). The author agrees with the conclusion
that state commission participation under section 252 is vol-
untary. A few courts, however, have held that the 1996 Act in
certain situations may have a coercive effect upon state com-
missions thereby making their participation effectively invol-
untary. See, e.g., Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of Wisconsin, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1157-59 (W.D. Wis. 1998)
[hereinafter Wisconsin Bell 1]. The arguments presented in
this article do not turn on whether state commission partici-
pation is voluntary.
Courts have further interpreted this language
to mean there is no obligation on state commis-
sions to participate in the review process. 9 In ef-
fect, a state may opt out of sections 251 and 252
by taking no action.
Section 252 ensures regulatory oversight either
by the state commission or the FCC in all situa-
tions except where the parties have reached a vol-
untary agreement through mediated negotiations
and the state commission does not participate in
the review process. 7" It also provides a scheme for
judicial review: "In any case in which a State com-
mission makes a determination" an aggrieved
party "may bring an action in an appropriate Fed-
eral district court to determine whether the agree-
ment ... meets the requirements of section 251
and [section 252]."'vl
The term "determination" in section 252(e) (6)
is broad and encompasses state commission deci-
sions approving or rejecting interconnection
agreements. 72 Courts have further interpreted
this term to include state commission decisions
enforcing and/or interpreting interconnection
agreements. 7
3
Jurisdiction of the federal district courts is ex-
clusive;7 4 state courts are expressly prohibited
from reviewing state commission determinations
by section 252(e) (4).75 The courts that have exer-
cised authority under section 252(e) (6) have con-
70 The FCC's implementing regulations provide that a
state commission "fails to act" tnder section 252(e) (5) if the
state commission "fails to respond, within a reasonable time,
to a request for mediation ... or for a request for arbitration
... or fails to complete an arbitration within the time limits
established in section 252(b)(4)(C)." 47 C.F.R. §51.801
(1998). A state commission has not failed to act, however, if it
refuses to review a voluntary agreement; instead, the volm-
tary or mediated agreement is considered approved. See 47
C.F.R. § 51.801 (1998). See also Wisconsin Bell I, 27 F. Supp. 2d
at 1158-59.
71 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).
72 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(e)(1), 252(e)(6).
73 See, e.g., Bell South Telecommunications v. MCImetro
Access Transmission Services, Inc., No. 3:99CV97-MU, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12783, at *7 (W.D. N.C. May 10, 1999) (not-
ing that "every court that has addressed this issue has held
that federal district courts have jurisdiction under
§ 252(e) (6) to review state utility commission decisions en-
forcing and interpreting interconnection agreements ap-
proved by the [state] commission pursuant to the [1996]
Act").
74 See 47 U.S.C. §252(e) (4).
75 See id. (stating, "No State court shall have jurisdiction
to review the action of a State commission in approving or
rejecting an agreement tnder this section").
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cluded that a state commission's determinations
are not reviewable until an interconnection agree-
ment has been approved or rejected by the state
commission. 7
6
III. THE ABROGATION DOCTRINE
Congress has a limited power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity by enacting legislation to es-
tablish private rights of action enforceable in the
federal courts against the states. 77 Prior to the
adoption of the 1996 Act, this power of abroga-
tion was very broad.78 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe, however, substantially cur-
tailed Congressional power to abrogate by
holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity pursuant to the exercise of its
Commerce Clause powers.7 9 Among the far reach-
ing consequences of the Court's decision, the va-
lidity of the judicial review scheme in section 252
has been called into question. 0
A. Pre-Seminole Tribe Framework of the
Abrogation Doctrine
The doctrine of abrogation springs from the
history of the doctrine of state sovereign immu-
nity and the ratification of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.' In Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793,82 the
Supreme Court held that the original jurisdiction
76 For example, in GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Nelson, the court
stated, "Considering the [1996] Act in its entirety, it is clear
that Congress intended to defer court review until an agree-
ment has become final." 969 F. Supp. 654, 656 (W.D. Wash.
1997). See also GTE North, Inc. v. Glazer, 989 F. Supp. 922,
925 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (concluding that prescribing statutory
time-tables for the state commission to reach a final decision
would be inconsistent with allowing an appeal of a state com-
mission decision prior to its final determination) (citing GTE
South, Inc. v. Morrison, 957 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Va. 1997));
GTE North, Inc. v. McCarty, 978 F. Supp. at 836 (finding that
"the language, structure, and purpose of the [1996] Act
make it fairly discernible that Congress intended to preclude
judicial review until a state commission either approves or
rejects a final interconnection agreement.").
77 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 11-13, overruled by
Seminole Tiibe, 517 U.S. at 66.
78 See, e.g, CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 20, at 411, 414-16
(stating that "Congress has broad authority to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment").
79 517 U.S. at 57-73.
80 See supra note 28 (listing relevant cases).
81 See, e.g, CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 378. The doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity precedes the ratification of
the Eleventh Amendment as well as the ratification of the
U.S. Constitution. This article, however, does not attempt to
of the federal courts extends to suits brought by
the citizens of one state against the government of
another state.83 The Court's decision reportedly
was "such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and
adopted,"8 4 expressly proscribing federal jurisdic-
tion over suits against one state brought by citi-
zens of another state.85 Nearly 100 years later, in
Hans v. Louisiana 6 the import of the Eleventh
Amendment was expanded to encompass suits
against a state brought by citizens of the same
state .
7
Several theories interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment have been advanced, 8 and as one
commentator noted, "The theory chosen deter-
mines the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and
the circumstances under which states may be sued
in federal courts."8' 9 In particular, the theory cho-
sen determines which constitutional powers Con-
gress may exercise to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity.90
There are two major theories for interpreting
the Eleventh Amendment that are consistent with
Hans and the plain text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment: subject matter jurisdiction and common
law immunity.91 Under the "subject matter juris-
diction" theory, the Eleventh Amendment im-
poses a constitutional limit on the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts.92 In particular,
the Eleventh Amendment limits the constitution-
trace the origins of the state sovereign immunity doctrine
prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution.
82 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
83 See id.
84 Seminole T7be, 517 U.S. at 69 (quoting Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934)).
85 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ("The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
86 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
87 See id.
88 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 374-83 (discussing
three theories for interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
89 Id. at 374. As evidence for this observation compare
the theoretical arguments advanced by the majority and dis-
senting opinions in College Savings, 527 U.S. 666.
90 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 374.
91 There is a third "diversity" theory that often is men-
tioned by commentators. This theory provides that the Elev-
enth Amendment does little more than limit the diversity ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. However, because this theory
is inconsistent with the Court's well established holding in
Hans, it has played a less influential role in the Supreme
Court's decisions. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 380-81.
92 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 375-77. See also
20001
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ally permissible scope of federal subject matter ju-
risdiction as originally delineated by Article III of
the Constitution. '- 3 Because Marbury v. Madison94
and its progeny provide that Congress cannot leg-
islatively expand the constitutionally permissible
scope of the federal judicial power, the "subject
matter jurisdiction" theory is inconsistent with the
view that Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the exercise of its Article I
powers.
Under the "common law immunity" theory, the
Eleventh Amendment is thought to have restored
state sovereign immunity as it existed under the
common law prior to ratification of the Constitu-
tion.95 The "common law immunity" theory is
consistent with an expansive view of the doctrine
of abrogation because the theory does not entail
constitutional limits on the subject matter juris-
diction of the federal courts or the attendant lim-
its on Congress's power to confer subject matter
jurisdiction. Congress can always override the
common law. Although a seemingly academic ex-
ercise, these two competing theories for interpret-
ing the Eleventh Amendment have played impor-
tant roles in the Supreme Court's precedent
addressing the scope of the doctrine of state sov-
ereign immunity. -' 6
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer9 7 is the leading case holding
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity. The Court asserted that Congress may abro-
gate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its pow-
ers derived under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9" The Court's analysis was based on
the reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted after the Eleventh Amendment, was
designed to limit the power of the states.99 The
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 472 (1987) (stating, "The Court has recognized that the
significance of the [Eleventh] Amendment 'lies in its affirma-
tion that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity
limits the grant ofjudicial authority in Art. II' of the Consti-
tution") (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)).
93 U.S. CONS'r. art. III, § 2 ("The Judicial power shall ex-
tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States ... to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
of another State;-between citizens of different States;-be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
94 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
95 See generally CIIEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 378-80
(providing a general overview of the "common law immu-
nity" theory).
Court reasoned that abrogation pursuant to sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was permis-
sible because "[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to
Section 5, not only is it exercising legislative au-
thority that is plenary within the terms of the con-
stitutional grant, it is exercising that authority
under one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority."'100
Fitzpatick is consistent with both the "common
law immunity" and the "subject matter jurisdic-
tion" theories for Eleventh Amendment interpre-
tation. As noted above, the "common law immu-
nity" theory is consistent with the abrogation
doctrine regardless of which congressional power
Congress invokes to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity: Congress can always override the com-
mon law. Furthermore, Fitzpatrick is consistent
with the "subject matter jurisdiction" theory be-
cause, as noted above, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment modified the relationship between the states
and the Federal Government. In other words, sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment modified
the constitutionally permissible scope of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, allowing Congress to
establish causes of action in furtherance of the
amendment's purposes and enforceable in the
federal courts against the states.
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. ,1O1 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause
power. Although there was no majority opinion,
fivejustices concluded that Congress can abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Inter-
state Commerce Clause power.1o2
96 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 374-75; see also text
accompanying, supra note 89 and text accompanying, supra
note 101.
97 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
98 See id. at 456.
99 See id. at 452-56.
10o Id. at 456.
'M 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
44. But cf Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475 (1987) (assuming without decid-
ing "that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting
States to suit in federal court is not confined to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment") (Powell, J., plurality).
102 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 416 (noting,
"There ... were five votes that Congress, acting pursuant to
its commerce clause authority, can create such federal court
jurisdiction: Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
and White").
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The Court's holding in Union Gas is consistent
with the "common law immunity" theory because
that theory does not impose limitations on Con-
gress's power to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity. However, Union Gas is inconsistent with the
"subject matter jurisdiction" theory because the
Interstate Commerce Clause could not possibly al-
ter the constitutionally permissible scope of fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction. The principles es-
tablished in Marbury v. Madison clearly provide
that Congress cannot extend the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the ceil-
ing established by the Constitution.10 3
As a consequence of the Court's decision in
Union Gas, the "common law immunity" theory
appeared to be the appropriate guide for inter-
preting the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly,
commentators suggested that Congress could ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity by "legislating
under any of its constitutional authority," includ-
ing its Article I powers."° 4 This extraordinarily
broad view of the abrogation doctrine was short-
lived.
B. Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Abrogation
Doctrine
The breadth of the abrogation doctrine was sig-
nificantly curtailed when the Supreme Court is-
sued its decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida on March 27, 1996.105 The five-member
majority expressly overruled Union Gas by holding
that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign im-
munity via the Commerce Clause. 1
0 6
In Seminole Tribe, the Court considered the via-
bility of the state sovereign immunity defense in
the context of a suit brought under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), which was en-
acted pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause. 10 7 The Court stated the IGRA "provides
103 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137.
104 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 414 (noting, however,
that the Court's decision in Union Gas was deeply fractured).
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
105 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
106 See generally id. at 57-73. The Court also addressed
the doctrine of Ex parte Young. This aspect of the Court's
holding is discussed in Part V.B. . Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote the opinion of the Court. The other members of the
majority included Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
107 See id. at 47-50.
108 Id. at 47.
109 See id.
that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming
activities only in conformance with a valid com-
pact between the tribe and the State in which the
gaming activities are located."'1 8 The IGRA im-
poses a duty on states to negotiate in good faith to
establish compacts with Indian tribes and pro-
vides a right of relief in the federal district courts
against states that fail to uphold that duty. 10 9
In 1991, the Seminole Tribe filed suit against
the State of Florida and the governor for failure
to negotiate in good faith. 110 Florida filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, asserting state sovereign immu-
nity."' The federal district court rejected the
state sovereign immunity defense but was reversed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.'I 2 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
to consider, inter alia, whether the IGRA was
"passed pursuant to a constitutional provision
granting Congress the power to abrogate" state
sovereign immunity.' 1 3
The Court began by addressing Union Gas. 1 4 It
noted there is no distinction between the Inter-
state Commerce Clause and the Indian Com-
merce Clause," 1 5 so its decision in Union Gas, if
followed, would compel the conclusion that the
IGRA abrogated state sovereign immunity." 6
However, the Court then overruled its decision in
Union Gas." 17
In doing so, the Court embraced the "subject
matter jurisdiction" theory for interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court declared,
Never before the decision in Union Gas had we sug-
gested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded
by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional
provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. In-
deed, it had seemed fundamental that Congress could
not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts be-
yond the bounds of Article Ill.118
The Court felt "bound to conclude that Union
Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be,
1 1o See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52.
''' See id. at 52.
112 See id. at 52-53, 59; rev'ing 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla.
1992); affg 11 F.3d 1016 (1994).
''-3 Id., cert. granted, 53 U.S. 1125 (1995).
114 517 U.S. at 59-66.
115 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (enumerating both
powers).
116 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-66.
''7 See id. at 66.
118 Id. at 65 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 174).
Any lingering doubts about whether the Court embraced the
subject matter jurisdiction theory were cast aside in College
Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. 2199.
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and now is, overruled."' 19 Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the action brought against the State of
Florida.120 This decision has far reaching implica-
tions because it calls into question the viability of
many federal judicial review schemes,' 2 1 includ-
ing that of section 252.
C. Section 252 Does Not Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity
The 1996 Act was enacted shortly before the de-
cision in Seminole Tribe, while Union Gas was still
controlling authority.' 22 At the time of enact-
ment, the judicial review scheme in section 252
conceivably could have abrogated state sovereign
immunity because the 1996 Act was enacted pur-
suant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. 123 The
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, however, fore-
closes that possibility. 124
IV. THE WAIVER DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's precedent provides that a
state may expressly waive its sovereign immu-
nity.' 2 5 The court has also recognized that a state
may constructively waive its sovereign immunity
119 517 U.S. at 66.
120 See id. at 73. As noted above, the tribe also filed suit
against Florida's governor. This aspect of the Court's deci-
sion focused on the Ex parte Young doctrine and is discussed
infra Parts III and IV.
121 Seminole Tribe is especially important because it laid
the foundation for three major decisions rendered by the
Court in June 1999. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 606, 119 S.
Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999); College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 526 U.S. 627 (1999).
122 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was signed into law on
February 8, 1996, only approximately two months before the
Seminole Tribe decision.
123 See supra note 25.
124 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57-73. Because section
252 was enacted pursuant to Congress's Interstate Commerce
Clause power, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe instructs
that Congress could not possibly have abrogated state sover-
eign immunity by enacting section 252. See supra note 29.
125 See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299
(1990) (finding express waiver). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 20, at 406.
126 See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks
Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by College Savings, 527
U.S. 666 (expressly repudiating the constructive waiver doc-
trine).
127 See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 286-87
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that in light of Seminole Tribe the
constructive waiver doctrine is no longer viable) rehg en banc
by voluntarily participating in certain activities. 12 6
In the wake of Seminole Tribe, plaintiffs turned to
this doctrine of constructive waiver in an effort to
circumvent the state sovereign immunity de-
fense. 127 However, very recent precedent casts sig-
nificant doubt on the continuing viability of the
constructive waiver doctrine.'12
Three general outcomes resulted from litiga-
tion surrounding sections 251 and 252 and the
doctrine of sovereign immunity: First, at least one
court embraced the proposition that the construc-
tive waiver doctrine simply was no longer viable in
light of Seminole Tribe. ' 2 9 Second, the same court
and others concluded that the basic elements for
invoking the constructive waiver doctrine are not
fulfilled when a state commission does nothing
more than participate in the regulatory scheme
under sections 251 and 252.130 These courts held,
inter alia, that state commission participation is in-
voluntary and therefore an impermissible basis
for waiver.1 31 Third, in spite of the Court's deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe, a majority of the federal
courts considering the issue found the construc-
tive waiver doctrine applicable, rejecting the no-
tion that state commission participation is some-
how involuntary. 13 2
granted, 178 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1998); Close v. New York, 125
F.3d 31, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that in light of
Seminole Tribe the continuing viability of the constructive
waiver doctrine is "precarious"); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illi-
nois Commerce Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315, 321 (7th Cir. 1999)
amended by, 183 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1999), and reh' granted,
183 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Seminole Tribe did
not invalidate the constructive waiver doctrine); Premo v.
Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 770 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Seminole Tribe did not invalidate the constructive waiver doc-
trine). But see College Savings, 567 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. 2219
(expressly repudiating the constructive waiver doctrine).
1218 See, e.g., MCI v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 168 F.3d at
321; Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d at 286-87; Close v.
New York, 125 F.3d at 40-41; Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d at 770
n.2.
129 See, e.g., AT&T Communications v. BellSouth,'43 F.
Supp. 2d at 600-01 (holding that it was bound by the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Chavez v. Arte Publico Press to reject the
constructive waiver doctrine when it was raised in the context
of litigation concerning the Copyright and Lanham Act ). In
Chavez, the Fifth Circuit held that "Congress cannot condi-
tion states' activities that are regulable by federal law upon
their 'implied consent' to being stied in federal court." 157
F.3d at 287.
13" See AT&T Communications v. BellSouth., 43 F. Supp. 2d
at 602-03; Wisconsin Bell I, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1157-59.
'31 See AT&T Communications v. BellSouth, 43 F. Supp. 2d
at 603; see also Wisconsin Bell, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
112 See, e.g., Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Smithville Tel. Co.,
31 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636-37 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (noting that a
state constructively waives its sovereign immtnity when a
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The Supreme Court'sJune 1999 decision in Col-
lege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid133 dramatically
changed the legal landscape. In that federal trade-
mark case, the Court substantially narrowed-if
not altogether abandoned-the doctrine of con-
structive waiver.'3 4 As a consequence, it now
seems clear that the constructive waiver doctrine
is not available to plaintiffs seeking to circumvent
the state sovereign immunity defense in the con-
text of litigation to enforce the requirements of
sections 251 and 252.135 As this article demon-
strates, however, even if some remnant of the con-
structive waiver doctrine survives College Savings,
the constructive waiver argument is untenable be-
cause Congress did not clearly condition state par-
ticipation on waiver. 136
A. Express Waiver
A state can expressly waive its sovereign immu-
nity by enacting a statute -13 7 that is sufficiently
clear to unmistakably show the state's intention to
waive sovereign immunity. 13 The "test for deter-
mining whether a state has waived its [sovereign]
immunity from federal-courtjurisdiction is a strin-
gent one."'139 Waiver is found "only where stated
'by the most express language or by such over-
whelming implication from the text as [will] leave
no room for any other reasonable construc-
tion."1 40 For example, a provision in a state con-
state commission participates in the process of developing
and approving interconnection agreements); Michigan Bell
Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., 16 F. Supp. 2d 817,
825-26 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (stating that because participation
in the Communications Act is voluntary, this constitutes a
constructive waiver of a state's IIth Amendment immunity);
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 9 F.
Supp. 2d 766, 770 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (stating that because the
PSC did not have to participate in the process of intercon-
nection, sovereign immunity was waived); U.S. West Commu-
nications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221,
1229-30 (D. Or. 1998) (if states choose to act under the
Communications Act, their regulatory decisions will be sub-
ject to review by federal courts); U.S. West Comm. Inc. v.
TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (W.D. Wash. 1997)
(noting that the state's 11th Amendment immunity was
waived by participating in the interconnection agreement
process). See also discussion cited supra note 76 (noting that
the author believes a state commission's participation under
section 252 is voluntary).
133 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
134 See id. at 2226-31.
135 At the time this article went to press, only one court
had fully and directly addressed the significance of the College
Savings decision in the context of such litigation. That court
held that in light of College Savings the state commission did
stitution or state statute authorizing litigation in
any court of competent jurisdiction is too ambigu-
ous to establish consent to suit in the federal
courts because such a provision does not expressly
refer to the federal courts.' 41 A provision in a
state constitution or state statute will constitute an
express waiver of state sovereign immunity only if
it specifies "the State's intent to subject itself to
suit in federal CoUrt. '" 142
Cases addressing the viability of the state sover-
eign immunity defense in the context of state
commission participation under sections 251 and
252 have not focused on express waiver by either
explicitly stating or implicitly assuming that the
state commission did not expressly waive its sover-
eign immunity.' 43 Indeed, there would be very lit-
tle if any basis for litigating the issue of state sover-
eign immunity if state commissions expressly
waived their immunity. The battleground over
waiver has instead focused on the doctrine of con-
structive waiver.
B. Constructive Waiver
1. Pre-College Savings Framework
The doctrine of constructive waiver, also some-
times described as implied waiver, provides that a
state may waive its sovereign immunity by volunta-
rily participating in certain activities.'"4 The lead-
not and could not constructively waive its sovereign immu-
nity. See Wisconsin Bell 11, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 712, 715.
136 See supra Part IV.B.3.
137 See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299,
306-09 (1990); CHEMERINSKV, supra note 20, at 406-10.
138 See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306-09.
139 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241
(1985).
140 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (citing
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). See
also Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305-06.
141 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-80 (1946).
142 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234 (emphasis in original).
143 See, e.g., Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp.
2d 1100, 1105 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (finding that "Indiana has not
expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity through
a statute or its constitution."); U.S. West Communications,
Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (W.D. Wash.
1997) (stating that the "State of Washington has not ex-
pressly waived its immunity by state statute or otherwise"). It
is conceivable, however, that some states have expressly
waived state sovereign immunity, thereby precluding the in-
vocation of that defense by state commissions.
144 See e.g. CHEMERINSKV, supra note 20, at 406-10. See also
Kinports, supra note 27, at 807.
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ing constructive waiver case is Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama State Docks Department, 45 where
employees of a railroad owned and operated by
the state of Alabama sued under the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act ("FELA"). ' 4" The Court con-
cluded that the state could not invoke the sover-
eign immunity defense because it constructively
waived its sovereign immunity by voluntarily
choosing to own and operate the railroad approx-
imately twenty years after enactment of the
FELA. 14 7 The Court declared that "when a State
leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and
enters into activities subject to congressional regu-
lation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as
if it were a private person or corporation."'14 The
Court emphasized that its holding was necessary
145 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
146 See id. at 184-85.
147 See id. at 184-85; see also id. at 192 ("Congress condi-
tioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce
upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the
Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate com-
merce, Alabama must be taken to have accepted that condi-
tion and to have consented to suit.").
148 Id. at 196 ("Congress enacted the FELA in the exer-
cise of its constitutional power to regulate interstate com-
merce.").
149 Id. at 197.
15O In Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare
v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)
(hereinafter Missouri k'mployees], the Court considered a suit
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by a
group of hospital employees seeking overtime compensation
from their employer, the State of Missouri. See id. at 281. The
principle issue considered by the Court was whether Parden
was distinguishable. See id. at 281-82. The Court distin-
guished Parden on the grounds that there was no clear state-
ment of congressional intent to "make it possible for a citizen
of that State or another State to sue the State in the federal
courts." Id. at 285. Unlike Alabama's decision to operate a
for-profit railroad, the Court reasoned, Missouri could not be
expected to abandon its role as a non-profit healthcare pro-
vider. See id. at 283-87. Accordingly, the Court was unwilling
to infer from the statute that Congress intended to subject
states, based upon their activities as non-profit healthcare
providers, to lawsuits in federal court. See id. at 285.
Subsequently, in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways &
Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987), the Court further
narrowed its holding in Parden. The issue in Welch was
whether an injured seaman could file a lawsuit in federal dis-
trict court under the Jones Act, which specifically provides a
private right of action for injured seamen. See id. at 470-71.
In considering "whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a
state employee from suing the State in federal court under
the Jones Act," id. at 470, a plurality of the Supreme Court
quoted approvingly Justice White's dissent in Parden: "O]nly
when Congress has . . . expressly declared that any State
which undertakes given regulable conduct will be deemed
thereby to have waived its immunity should courts disallow
the invocation of [the state sovereign immunity] defense." Id.
at 477 (quoting Parden, 377 U.S. at 198-99 (WhiteJ., dissent-
to ensure "the efficient working of our federal-
ism" because "States have entered and are enter-
ing numerous forms of activity which, if carried
on by a private person or corporation, would be
subject to federal regulation."'' 49
In the ensuing decades, the Court substantially
narrowed the holding in Parden.150 Nonetheless,
commentators and lower federal courts con-
cluded (although not uniformly) that the doc-
trine of constructive waiver could be invoked if
two essential requirements were fulfilled.' 5' First,
Congress's intent to condition state participation
in some activity upon waiver had to be expressed
in unmistakably clear language. 152 Second, the
state's participation in the activity had to be vol-
ing)).
The plurality, however, declared that "to the extent that
Parden... is inconsistent with the requirement that an abro-
gation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must
be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled."
Id. at 478. The Court's use of the term "abrogation" is unfor-
tunate because it causes confusion about whether Parden was
a constructive waiver case or an abrogation case. Parden is dis-
tinguishable from the pure abrogation cases, see generally
supra Part Il1, because the Court assumed that some form of
state conduct was necessary to circumvent state sovereign im-
munity. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
The Court did not address, however, the portion of the
decision in Parden that held a state may constructively waive
its sovereign immunity by voluntarily engaging in a regulable
activity. Arguably, the Court's decision in Welch therefore left
open the possibility that a state may constructively waive its
sovereign immunity if Congress declares in unmistakably
clear language that any state that voluntarily undertakes a
particular activity waives its sovereign immunity. The Court's
holding in Welch merely overruled Parden to the extent that
Parden is inconsistent with the clear statement rule expressed
in Welch. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 470.
1i1 See id; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 410; see,
e.g., Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. WorldCom Technologies,
Inc., 179 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir, 1999);
Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (S.D.
Ind. 1998); Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Smithville Tel. Co., 31 F.
Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. Ind. 1998); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell-
South Telecomm., 9 F. Stipp. 2d 766 (E.D. Ky. 1998); Michi-
gan Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Michigan, Inc., 16 F.
Supp. 2d 817 (W.D. Mich. 1998); U.S. West Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 991 F. Supp. 1299
(D. Utah 1998); Illinois Bell Tel. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc.,
1998 WL 547278 (N.D. II1. Aug. 27, 1998); U.S. West Commu-
nications, Inc. v. TCG Oregon, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Or.
1998); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet,
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D. Or. 1998); U.S. West Communi-
cations, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Wash.
1997); U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Reinbold, supra note
28.
152 See id. This clear statement rule essentially is the same
rule that is applicable to express waivers. See generally supra
Part IV.A.
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untary.153 In other words, a state would not be
deemed to have waived its immunity unless it had
a realistic choice about whether to participate in
the activity upon which waiver was conditioned. 154
Essentially applying this two-prong test, one fed-
eral appellate circuit and over a dozen federal dis-
trict courts have considered the viability of the
constructive waiver doctrine in the context of liti-
gation under sections 251 and 252.155 A majority
of the courts concluded that state commissions
constructively waive their sovereign immunity by
participating under those sections. 156
The leading case finding constructive waiver
based upon state commission participation is MCI
Telecommunications v. Illinois Commerce Commission,
decided in February 1999 by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. 157 In that case, the
court first concluded that Congress' intent to con-
dition state participation in the regulatory scheme
under sections 251 and 252 may be inferred from
the express terms of section 252 which indicates
Congress's intent to subject state commission de-
terminations to review in the federal courts. 158
Next, the court concluded that states have a "real-
istic and genuine" choice about whether to as-
sume the 252 regulatory function or whether to
defer to the FCC.' 59 Accordingly, the court held
that "by electing to assume responsibility ... the
[state commission] waived the State's immunity
from suit in federal court."'1 60 The decision in
MCI Telecommunications was reaffirmed by the Sev-
enth Circuit in Illinois Bell Telephone v. WorldCom
Technologies.' 6 '
On the other hand, at least two federal district
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See generally supra note 151 (listing relevant case law).
156 See generally id.
157 168 F.3d 315 (1999).
158 See id. at 322.
159 See id. at 323.
160 Id.
161 179 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999).
162 43 F. Supp. 2d 593 (1999).
163 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
164 See id.
165 See supra note 127 (listing relevant cases).
166 See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at
2226-2231. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court.
The other members of the majority included Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.
167 See id. at 2223. Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act
provides that "[a]ny person" who engages in false or mislead-
ing advertising "shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
courts have held that in the unique circumstances
involved in suits brought to enforce the require-
ments of sections 251 and 252, the essential ele-
ments required for constructive waiver are absent.
These cases include AT&T Communications of the
South Central States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunica-
tions, Inc.,' 62 decided by the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Louisiana in March 1999,
and Wisconsin Bell v. Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin,'63 decided by the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin in November
1998.164 Although the validity of the decision in
Wisconsin Bell was called into question by the Sev-
enth Circuit's subsequent decision in MCI Telecom-
munications, the Supreme Court's June 1999 deci-
sion in College Savings changed matters
significantly. Indeed, the decision in College Sav-
ings vindicated those courts that concluded that
the doctrine of constructive waiver did not survive
Seminole Tribe.' 65
2. Impact of College Savings On The Constructive
Waiver Doctrine
In College Savings, a plurality decision of the
Supreme Court expressly repudiated the doctrine
of constructive waiver.1 66 In that case, College Sav-
ings Bank asserted that Florida Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Education Expense Board ("Florida Pre-
paid"), an agency of the State of Florida, violated
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which imposes
civil liability on any person, including any state or
state agency, who engages in false or misleading
advertising. 167 Florida Prepaid invoked the state
such act." Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(a) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1). Section 43(a)(2) provides that "the
term 'any person' includes any State, instrumentality of a
State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State act-
ing in his or her official capacity." Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act) § 43(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Section 40 of the
Lanham Act provides that
[a]ny State, instrumentality of a State or any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting
in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune,
under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of
the United States or under any other doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person,
including any governmental or nongovernmental entity
for any violation under this chapter.
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 40 (a), 15 U.S.C.
§1122 (a). Had the Court in College Savings not repudiated the
constructive waiver doctrine, the foregoing provisions would
have strongly weighed in favor of finding that that Florida
Prepaid waived its sovereign immunity by participating in ac-
tivities regulated by the Lanham Act.
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sovereign immunity defense thereby requiring
College Savings Bank to identify a mechanism for
circumventing that defense. 168
The Court first addressed the applicability of
the abrogation doctrine.169 In light of the Court's
prior decisions in Fitzpatrick, Union Gas and Semi-
nole Tribe,170 this abrogation inquiry was limited to
considering whether the Lanham Act's proscrip-
tion against false or misleading advertising was en-
acted pursuant to Congress's powers under sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 71 College
Savings Bank argued that Congress established
the cause of action under section 43(a) to remedy
and deter state deprivations of property in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 72 The Court rejected the conten-
tion that a cognizable property interest was at
stake and therefore concluded that Congress did
not abrogate state sovereign immunity. 173
Next, the Court considered the constructive
waiver doctrine. 74 Rather than address whether
the basic elements required for constructive
waiver were fulfilled, the Court declared, "the
constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill
conceived, and [there is] no merit in attempting
to salvage any remnant of it.' 17 5 The Court then
proceeded to expressly overrule Parden. 176
To justify overruling Parden, the Court stated
that it could not reconcile Parden with its cases
that require an unequivocal expression by a state
that it waives sovereign immunity. 177 The Court
noted that "[t]here is a fundamental difference
between a State's expressing unequivocally that it
168 See id. at 2224.
169 See id. at 2224-27.
171) See supra Part Ill.
171 See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
172 See id. at 2224.
173 See id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated,
"The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to
exclude others ... The Lanham Act's false-advertising provi-
sions, however, bear no relationship to any right to exclude."
[d. at 2224-25. Had the Court concluded that there was a
cognizable property interest at stake, it would have pro-
ceeded to consider "whether the prophylactic measure taken
under purported authority of § 5... was genuinely necessary
to prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
2225.
174 See id. at 2226-31.
175 Id. at 2228.
176 See id. at 2228 (finding, "Whatever may remain of our
decision in Parden is expressly overruled").
177 See id.
178 College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
179 Id. (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527,
529 (1858)) (emphasis added).
waives its immunity, and Congress expressing un-
equivocally its intention that if the State takes cer-
tain action it shall be deemed to have waived that
immunity."' 78 Providing notice to the state that if
it engages in certain activity it will be subject to
suit is insufficient to prove "that the state made an
'altogether voluntary' decision to waive its immu-
nity." 179
The Court then analogized state sovereign im-
munity to "other constitutionally protected privi-
leges" and noted that constitutional rights are not
typically the type of rights subject to constructive
waiver.' "' Specifically, the Court reasoned that in
the arena of federal sovereign immunity, a close
analogy to state immunity, waivers clearly must be
express and not implied.I8 The Court concluded
that the same rule should apply to state sovereign
immunity. 182
It also is difficult to reconcile Parden with Semi-
nole Tribe. First, the Court argued that Parden is
premised upon the common law immunity theory
of the Eleventh Amendment which was rejected
by the Court in Seminole Tribe.18 3 Second, the
Court argued that the constructive waiver doc-
trine did not survive the decision in Seminole Tribe
because of the functional similarities between the
constructive waiver and abrogation doctrines. 18 4
The Court rejected the notion that these inconsis-
tencies could somehow be reconciled by limiting
the applicability of the constructive waiver doc-
trine to those situations where a state acts as a
"market participant."'1 5 Thus the Court con-
cluded that the constructive waiver doctrine
180 See id. at 2229 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 673 (1974)).
181 See id. at 2229.
182 See id.
183 See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2229. See
also supra Part III.B. If there were any doubts about whether
the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe rejected the common
law immunity theory and embraced the subject matter juris-
diction theory, those doubts were firmly laid to rest by the
Court during last term. See id.; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
119 S. Ct. at 2240 (1999). (discussing in detail the theoretical
underpinnings of state sovereign immunity).
184 See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2230
("There is little more than a verbal distinction between say-
ing that Congress can make Florida liable to private parties
for false or misleading advertising in interstate commerce...
and saying the same thing but adding at the end 'if Florida
chooses to engage in such advertising.'").
185 Id. at 2230-2231. The "market participant" concep-
tion of the constructive* waiver doctrine arises from the spe-
cific facts of Parden and the Court's subsequent decisions in
Missouri Employees and Welch. See supra note 150.
[Vol. 8
Judicial Review of Interconnection Agreements
should be abandoned. 186
Finally, the Court addressed the relevance of its
decisions in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com-
mission18 7 and South Dakota v. Dole.188 In Petty, the
Court held that "a bi-state commission which had
been created pursuant to an interstate compact
(and which [the Court] assumed partook of state
sovereign immunity) had consented to suit by rea-
son of a suability provision attached to the con-
gressional approval of the compact."189 In Dole,
the Court held that Congress may use its spending
power to achieve goals that it could not directly
impose upon states by indirectly conditioning the
provision of federal funds upon some action to be
taken by the state."'190
In addressing these holdings, the Court distin-
guished Petty and Dole on the grounds that, unlike
the situation under the Lanham Act, Congress
had conditioned the state's receipt of a "gift. '
With regard to Petty, the Court observed that
"[s] tates cannot form an interstate compact with-
out first obtaining the express consent of Con-
gress; the granting of such consent is a gratu-
ity." °192 Similarly, in Dole, the Court observed,
congressional disbursement of funds is a gift, and
Congress is not obligated to act upon its Spending
Clause power.' 93 In the situation under the Lan-
ham Act, however, "what Congress threatens if the
186 The author disagrees with the Supreme Court's con-
clusion that the constructive waiver doctrine cannot be rec-
onciled with its decision in Seminole Tribe. The Court in Mis-
souri Employees recognized that Parden is not predicated on
the "common law immunity" theory:
[I]f Parden was concerned merely with the surrender of
common-law sovereign immunity when the State granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce, it would
seem unnecessary to reach the question of waiver or con-
sent, for Congress could subject the States to suit by
their own citizens whenever it was deemed necessary or
appropriate to the regulation of commerce. No more
would be required.
411 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added).
The Court in Parden did reach the issue of consent and
therefore did not rely on the "common law immunity" theory
in reaching its decision. Accordingly, the constructive waiver
doctrine is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of
Seminole Tribe. Nor is there a problem with the continuing
viability of the constructive waiver doctrine when the holding
of Seminole Tribe is viewed at a functional level. The Court in
College Savings failed to consider the functional dissimilarities
between the constructive waiver and abrogation doctrines.
Although both doctrines can effectuate the same result, the
functional requirements for invoking each doctrine are very
different. Unlike the abrogation doctrine, the constructive
waiver doctrine only may be invoked if the state voluntarily
participates in an activity upon which waiver clearly is condi-
tioned.
State refuses to agree to its condition is not the
denial of a gift or gratuity, but a sanction: exclu-
sion of the State from an otherwise permissible ac-
tivity."' 194 In other words, exclusion of the state
from such permitted activities as advertising is a
sanction. The Court concluded its analysis of the
constructive waiver doctrine by stating that "where
the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the
States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point
of coercion is automatically passed-and the vol-
untariness of waiver destroyed-when what is at-
tached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of
the State from otherwise lawful activity."'' 1 5
The Court's analysis of the constructive waiver
doctrine leaves no doubt that the touchstone in-
quiry for determining whether a valid waiver ex-
ists is voluntariness. A waiver cannot be effectu-
ated by compulsion, rather it must be the product
of a real and genuine choice by the state. Addi-
tionally, the Court substantially, if not entirely, re-
pudiated the principle that a state may construc-
tively waive its sovereign immunity. The Court's
discussion of Petty and Dole, however, may leave
open the possibility-albeit improbable given the
Court's recent jurisprudence in the area of state
sovereign immunity-that where Congress has
clearly conditioned the receipt of a "gift" upon
waiver, state sovereign immunity is waived by the
Furthermore, there is no problem with the fact that both
doctrines accomplish the same result. The Court in Seminole
Dibe obviously did not intend to preclude the possibility that
state sovereign immunity can be circumvented because such
a broad proscription would undermine the doctrine of ex-
press waiver as much as it would undermine the doctrine of
constructive waiver. Indeed, the background discussion in
Seminole ribe appears to reaffirm the basic principle that a
state may waive its sovereign immunity. Although ill founded,
the Court's decision in College Savings simply cannot be ig-
nored, but rather must be substantially addressed in connec-
tion with any constructive waiver analysis.
187 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
188 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See also New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("Where Congress has the
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce
Clause, we have recognized Congress's power to offer States
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regula-
tion.").
189 College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing
Petty, 359 U.S. 275).
190 See id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
191 See id.
192 Id.
193 See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. at 2231.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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state's acceptance. As noted injustice Breyer's dis-
sent, the justicability of the gift/sanction distinc-
tion is dubious.'9 " Nonetheless, this is the distinc-
tion upon which the Court relied.' 9 7
It is too early to determine how courts review-
ing cases brought under section 252 will react to
College Savings. The Seventh Circuit failed to men-
tion College Savings, although that case was de-
cided four weeks before Illinois Bell's amended de-
cision. 198 However, around the same time, the
Seventh Circuit granted a rehearing in MCI Tele-
communications, acknowledging the significance of
the College Savings decision. 9 The court in Wis-
consin Bell I issued a follow-on decision in Wiscon-
sin Bell I in which it concluded that College Savings
foreclosed the possibility of invoking the construc-
tive waiver doctrine to circumvent the state sover-
eign immunity defense.21 0 As this article went to
press, these and other proceedings were still
pending.
3. State Commissions Do Not Constructively Waive
State Sovereign Immunity By Participating Under
Sections 251 and 252
In the wake of College Savings there is little if any
room for advancing the constructive waiver argu-
ment. The Court's decision in College Savings ex-
pressly repudiated the doctrine of constructive
waiver. The Court's decision may leave open the
possibility that where Congress has clearly condi-
tioned the receipt of a "gift" upon waiver, state
sovereign immunity is waived when the state ac-
cepts that gift.20 ' Even assuming for the sake of
argument, however, that this or some other rem-
nant of the constructive waiver doctrine survives
College Savings, the essential requirements for
waiver are not fulfilled if a state commission does
196 See id. at 2236 ("The distinction that the majority
seeks to make-drawn in terms of gifts and entitlements-
does not exist.").
197 The Court's discussion offers several clues about how
to distinguish between a gift and a sanction. First, in response
to Justice Breyer's criticism, the Court acknowledged that
"when the gift that is threatened to be withheld is substantial
enough," the withholding of that gift amounts to the imposi-
tion of a sanction. See id. at 2231. Second, the Court's analysis
appears to embrace the notion that where Congress condi-
tions a state's participation in an "otherwise lawful activity"
upon waiver, the withholding constitutes a sanction. See id.
198 See Illinois Bell v. Worldcom, 179 F.3d 566, 570 (7th
Cir. 1999).
199 See MCI v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 183 F.3d 567
nothing more than participate under sections 251
and 252.
The death knell for any waiver argument based
merely upon state commission participation-
pre- or post-College Savings and regardless of the
distinction involving "gifts"-is the conclusion
that Congress did not clearly condition state par-
ticipation upon waiver.2112 Even assuming that
state commission participation is voluntary and
can reasonably be characterized as a "gift" of
sorts, mere participation does not constitute
waiver if Congress did not intend to make waiver a
condition of state participation.2 1 1 3
Initially, it is important to note that the Com-
munications Act does not expressly condition
state participation under sections 251 and 252
upon waiver. The Communications Act makes no
mention whatsoever of the Eleventh Amendment
or the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. In-
stead, such a condition-assuming one even ex-
ists-must be inferred.
Numerous courts have drawn inferences from
the overall "structure" of section 252 to conclude
that Congress intended state commission partici-
pation to be conditioned upon waiver. This con-
clusion logically is predicated on the observation
that Congress intended state commissions to be
defendants in actions brought under section
252(e) (6). Although there is some debate over
this issue, the author concedes for the sake of ar-
gument that state commissions can and should be
named as defendants in actions under section
252(e) (6).204
More troubling, however, is the corollary as-
sumption that the existence of a remedy against
state commissions under section 252(e) (6) sug-
gests that Congress intended to make waiver a
necessary condition of state participation in the
(7th Cir. 1999).
200 See Wisconsin Bell 11, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 715. The court
expressly rejected the argument that Petty or Dole provides
the basis for a waiver theory stating that "the [1996 Act] is
neither an interstate compact nor an act involving a gift of
funds." Id.
21 See supra Part V.B.2.
2 12 See supra notes 147-154 and accompanying text. See
also supra Part V.A (discussing requirements for express
waiver).
203 See Id.
204 See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing whether a
state commission can be named as a defendant).
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regulatory processes established by sections 251/
252. This assumption is not supported by the text
of the Communications Act because the text does
not mention or allude to the Eleventh Amend-
ment or the doctrine of state sovereign immunity;
nor is the assumption somehow necessary to rem-
edy any flaw in section 252.
Section 252 provides a viable, congressionally
mandated mechanism for dealing with the situa-
tion where a state commission invokes the state
sovereign immunity defense in a proceeding
under section 252(e)(6). 20 5 Section 252(e)(5)
provides,
If a State commission fails to act to carry out its respon-
sibility under this section in any proceeding or other matter
under this section, then the [FCC] shall issue an order
preempting the State commission's jurisdiction of that
proceeding or matter ... and shall assume the responsi-
bility of the State commission tinder this section with
respect to the proceeding or matter and act for the
State commission. 20
6
Without a doubt, an action under section
252(e) (6) is a "proceeding or other matter under
• . . section [252] ."207 Once the state commission
successfully invokes its sovereign immunity, it has
failed to act in a proceeding under section 252,
and the FCC is subject to an express and unequiv-
ocal statutory command to preempt the state
commission "with respect to the proceeding . . .
and act for the State commission." In other words,
because state commissions are the intended de-
fendants in actions under section 252(e)(6),
when a state commission successfully invokes state
sovereign immunity, the state commission has
"failed to act to carry out its responsibility under
this section [252], ' '20s and thus the FCC is re-
quired to assume the role of the state commission
under sections 251/252.29 The express language
of section 252, therefore, provides a mechanism
205 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6).
206 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (5) (emphasis added).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Note that a plaintiff would not take issue with the
conclusion that the state commission is an intended defend-
ant in an action under section 252(e) (6) because if the state
commission is not an intended defendant it can entirely es-
cape judicial review.
210 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (5). The FCC could conceivably
take the position that 47 C.F.R. § 51.801 (b) provides an ex-
haustive list of the situations in which it will determine that a
state commission has "failed to act." However, this position is
inconsistent with the plain text of section 252(e)(5) and
therefore would not be entitled to any deference under the
principles laid down by the Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat'l Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Further-
for dealing with state commissions that success-
fully invoke their sovereign immunity.2 1
Given the regulatory scheme, on what grounds
can a federal court conclude that sections 251/
252 establish a waiver mechanism? There is no
need infer such a mechanism because the FCC, by
acting for the state commission, ensures that all
the essential functions of regulatory oversight are
fulfilled in the absence of state commission partic-
ipation.21' Indeed, it seems absurd to suggest that
section 252 somehow is in need of such an ex-
traordinary judicial interpretation because where
a state commission fails to participate from the
very beginning, the FCC assumes the responsibili-
ties of, for example, mediating and arbitrating in-
terconnection disputes.2 12 Arguably, a federal
court would suggest that the FCC is incapable of
fulfilling the role envisioned by Congress if it were
to conclude that section 252 needs to be inter-
preted as providing a waiver mechanism.
Indeed, the very best that can be said for such
an interpretation is that it might make the regula-
tory scheme function somewhat more efficiently.
However, even assuming that efficiency would be
improved, that would not be an adequate basis for
a federal court to concluded that sections 251/
252 provide a waiver mechanism. It is not the job
of a court to interpret a statute simply to make it
"better" or otherwise more to its liking. The signif-
icant deference the Supreme Court affords states
via the doctrine of state sovereign immunity-as
evidenced by its decisions in Seminole Tribe and
College Savings-is entirely at odds with the notion
that a federal court should or could infer a waiver
mechanism. Based on the Dole and Petty cases,
Congress may have the power to make waiver a
condition of the receipt of the "gift" of participa-
more, it seems unlikely that the FCC would take such an ex-
treme position. In drafting rules implementing section 252,
the FCC likely did not even entertain the possibility that state
commissions would be able to successfully invoke the state
sovereign immunity defense and thereby fail to act in a pro-
ceeding under section 252, i.e., section 252(e) (6). See gener-
ally In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, modified by 11 FCC Rcd. 13042
(1996), partially vacated by Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 120
F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), and rev'd in part by AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). Additionally, the FCC
was quite clear that it was adopting "interim procedures" and
intended to learn from experience. See id. at 16218, para.
1284.
211 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.805, 51.807 (1998).
212 See id.
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tion-thereby effectuating waiver when a state
commission choses to participate-but there is in-
sufficient basis for concluding that Congress exer-
cised that power by adopting the 1996 Act.
Nor should it be forgotten that even under the
pre-College Savings conception of the constructive
waiver doctrine, constructive waiver is found only
if Congress's intent to condition state participa-
tion in some activity upon waiver is expressed in
unmistakably clear language.2 13 Even assuming the
foregoing analysis does nothing more than cast
reasonable doubt on the argument that Congress
intended to condition state participation upon
waiver, the clear statement rule could not possibly
be fulfilled.2 14
Considering the foregoing analysis and the fact
that College Savings expressly repudiated the con-
structive waiver doctrine, it seems clear that con-
structive waiver is not a viable mechanism for cir-
cumventing the state sovereign immunity defense
in the context of litigation to enforce the require-
ments of sections 251 and 252.
V. EX PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE
The Ex parte Young doctrine is a well-established
method for circumventing the state sovereign im-
munity defense. 215 The doctrine provides that a
federal court may exercise subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a suit against a state officer if the suit
seeks only prospective relief in order to "end a
continuing violation of federal law." 21 However,
in those situations where Congress has established
a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement
of a federal right, Seminole Tribe instructs that fed-
eral courts should hesitate before permitting a
suit to proceed under Ex parte Young.217
213 See supra notes 147-154 and accompanying text. See
also supra Part [V.A. (discussing requirements for express
waiver).
214 Moreover, even if it were fulfilled, the Court held in
College Savings that such a clear statement would not be
enough: "There is a fundamental difference between a
State's expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity,
and Congress expressing unequivocally its intention that if
the State takes certain action it shall be deemed to have
waived that immunity." College Savings, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
Thus, a plaintiff would still be reqtired to demonstrate that
the state expressed unequivocally that it waived its sovereign
immunity.
215 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 390-94.
216 Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
217 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-76.
218 See supra note 32 (listing relevant cases).
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce the requirements
of sections 251 and 252 have attempted to invoke
Ex parte Young to circumvent state sovereign im-
munity. Federal courts considering the applicabil-
ity of Ex parte Young in this context mostly have
concluded that Ex parte Young relief is available.2 18
Furthermore, the courts in Michigan Bell Telephone
Company v. Climax Telephone Company,219 MCI Tele-
communications Corporation v. BellSouth Telecommu-
nications, Inc.,220 Indiana Bell Telephone Company v.
McCarty22 1 and MCI Telecommunications Corporation
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company222 specifically ad-
dressed the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe and
concluded that it does not limit the availability of
Ex parte Young relief to enforce the requirements
of sections 251 and 252. However, the courts in
AT&T Communications,22 3 Wisconsin Bell 22 4 and
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. Fisby 25
have concluded otherwise. 226
A. Essential Requirements for Obtaining Ex
Parte Young Relief
As mentioned, federal court jurisdiction over a
suit against a state officer may be premised on the
doctrine of Ex parte Young if the suit seeks only
prospective relief in order to "prevent a continu-
ing violation of federal law."' 2 7 Thus, if a state of-
ficer's conduct causes a state government to vio-
late federal law, a plaintiff may file suit against the
state officer and thereby attempt to enjoin the il-
legal behavior.228 The underlying theoretical basis
for the Ex parte Young doctrine is that a state of-
ficer who acts in violation of federal law is not act-
ing pursuant to legitimate state authority and
therefore is not protected by state sovereign im-
munity. 2
29
2 19 186 F.3d 726 (6th Cir.1999), opinion withdrawn by
court on Jan. 10, 2000; amended opinion reported at - F.3d -,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 585 Uan. 18, 2000).
22(1 9 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
221 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
222 1998 WL 156678 (N.D. 111. Mar. 31, 1998), affd on
issue of constructive waiver, MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 1999).
223 43 F. Stipp. 2d 593 (M.D. La. 1999).
224 27 F. Stipp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wis. 1998).
225 998 F. Supp. 625 (D. Md. 1998).
226 See AT&T Communications v. BellSouth, 43 F. Supp. 2d
at 602-03; Wisconsin Bell I, 27 F. Stipp. 2d at 1161; Frisby, 998
F. Supp. at 630.
227 Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
228 See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 391-92.
2229 See id. at 392-93.
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B. Impact of Seminole Tribe on Ex Parte Young
Doctrine
The Court's decision in Seminole Tribe limits the
availability of Ex parte Young relief2 30 Because
Congress could not use its Indian Commerce
Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity, the Court concluded that the Tribe's lawsuit-
against the state of Florida was barred. 23' The
Court then considered whether the suit could
proceed against Florida's governor under the Ex
parte Young doctrine.23 2
The Court determined that "where Congress
has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the
enforcement against a state of a statutorily created
right, a court should hesitate before casting aside
those limitations and permitting an action against
a state officer based upon Ex parte Young."233 The
next issue the Court considered was whether the
IGRA established a "detailed" remedial
scheme. 2 34 In concluding that the IGRA did estab-
lish such a scheme, the Court provided several ex-
amples of the IGRA's "intricate procedures":
[Under the IGRA,] where the court finds that the State
has failed to negotiate in good faith [with an Indian
tribe], the only remedy prescribed is an order directing
the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact
within 60 days. And if the parties disregard the court's
order and fail to conclude a compact within the 60-day
period, the only sanction is that each party then must
submit a proposed compact to a mediator who selects
the one which best embodies the terms of the [IGRA].
Finally, if the State fails to accept the compact selected
by the mediator, the only sanction against it is that the
mediator shall notify the Secretary of the Interior who
then must prescribe regulations governing ... gaming
on the tribal lands at issue. 2
35
The Court concluded, "the fact that Congress
chose to impose upon the State a liability that is
significantly more limited than would be the lia-
bility imposed upon the state officer under Ex
parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had
no wish to create the latter."2 3 6 Accordingly, the
Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine was
not applicable. 237
The decision in Seminole Tribe instructs that a re-
medial scheme is detailed if the remedial scheme
2 30 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-76.
231 See id. at 72.
232 See id. at 73-76.
233 Id. at 74.
234 See id.
235 See id. at 74-75.
236 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75-76.
237 See id.
238 Id. at 74-75.
specifies forms of relief that are more limited
than those typically available under Ex parte Young.
For example, the Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe
relies at least in part on the observation that the
only form of relief that a federal court is author-
ized by the IGRA to provide is an "order directing
the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a com-
pact within 60 days."2 38 Under the IGRA, the fed-
eral court does not even have the contempt power
because "if the parties disregard the court's order
and fail to conclude a compact within the 60-day
period, the only sanction is that each party then
must submit a proposed compact to a mediator
who selects the one which best embodies the
terms of the [IGRA]."239
There are at least two other ways in which a re-
medial scheme may be detailed and therefore sug-
gest Congress's intent to foreclose Ex parte Young
relief. First, Seminole Tribe may support the propo-
sition that a remedial scheme is detailed if it iden-
tifies classes of defendants exclusive of state of-
ficers. Specifically, the Court in Seminole Tribe
observed that the remedial scheme under the
IGRA focuses on the state, not state officers.2 40
From this the Court may have inferred that Con-
gress intended to limit the availability of relief to
an action against the state.2 4 1
Second, Seminole Tribe also may support the
proposition that a remedial scheme is detailed if it
imposes procedural predicates to obtaining fed-
eral court review that are inconsistent with those
for obtaining Ex pane Young relief. At the begin-
ning of its opinion, the Court noted that in an ac-
tion brought under the IGRA, a tribe is required
to wait a specified period of time after requesting
the state to enter into negotiations before at-
tempting to initiate suit in federal court.2 42 No
such predicate exists for obtaining Ex parte Young
relief. Whether this observation really suggests an-
other way in which a remedial scheme may be de-
tailed is unclear, however, because the Court did
not discuss this characteristic of the IGRA in its
discussion of the Ex parte Young issue.
239 Id. at 74-75 ("By contrast with [the remedial scheme
under the IGRA], an action brought against a state official
under Ex parte Young would expose that official to the full
remedial powers of a federal court, including, presumably,
contempt sanctions.").
240 See id. at 75, n.17.
241 See id. at 75-76.
242 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47-51.
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Whether the Seminole Tribe exception applies to
the doctrine of Ex parte Young is determined in a
case-by-case analysis. Subsequent to its decision in
Seminole Tribe, the Court stated, "Last Term... we
did not allow a suit raising a federal question to
proceed based on Congress's provision of an al-
ternative review mechanism. Whether the pre-
sumption in favor of federal court jurisdiction in
this type of case is controlling will depend upon
the particular context."243 Echoing this view, one
commentator stated that "the impact of Seminole
Tribe upon Ex parte Young remedies turns on analy-
sis of the terms, history, purpose, and context of
the remedial provisions of the particular statute
sought to be enforced." 244
C. Ex Parte Young Relief is Available to Enforce
the Requirements of Sections 251 and 252
So Long As the FCC Does Not Issue an
Order Preempting State Commission
Participation.
At least initially, a plaintiff can and should seek
Ex parte Young relief to enforce the requirements
of sections 251 and 252. In such a suit, the essen-
tial requirements for obtaining Ex parte Young re-
lief are fulfilled. The Seminole Tribe exception, at
least initially, does not foreclose the availability of
Ex parte Young relief because sections 251 and 252
do not impose a sufficiently detailed remedial
scheme to suggest Congress's intent to foreclose
Ex parte Young relief. However, there is an impor-
tant caveat: Matters change if and when the state
commission is dismissed from the suit and the
FCC fulfills its statutory duty to issue an order pre-
empting further participation by the state com-
mission,. At that point, the "exclusive" remedies
available to the plaintiff are a proceeding by the
FCC and judicial review of the FCC's actions in
that proceeding. Thus, upon issuance of the
FCC's order, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe
instructs that Ex parte Young relief ceases to be
available.
243 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,
277 (1997).
244 David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 550 (1997).
245 See AT&T Communications v. BellSouth, 43 F. Supp. 2d
at 602-03; MCI Telecomm. v. Frisby, 998 F. Supp. 625,
629-30 (D. Md. 1998); Wisconsin Bell 1, 27 F. Supp. 2d at
1159-61. The court in Wisconsin Bell II, however, concluded
1. The Essential Requirements for Obtaining Ex
Parte Young Relief are Fulfilled in an Action to
Enforce the Requirements of Sections 251 and
252
The federal cases considering the applicability
of Ex parte Young in suits to enforce the require-
ments of sections 251 and 252 have uniformly
concluded that the essential requirements for ob-
taining Ex parte Young relief are fulfilled. The fed-
eral cases rejecting the applicability of Ex parte
Young have done so exclusively under the excep-
tion announced by the Court in Seminole Tribe.245
Nonetheless, an analysis of the applicability of Ex
parte Young relief should provide at least passing
attention to the issue of whether the essential re-
quirements for obtaining Ex parte Young relief are
fulfilled.
As discussed above, the named defendants in
an Ex parte Young suit are one or more state of-
ficers.2 46 Plaintiffs seeking to enforce the require-
ments of sections 251 and 252 fulfill this require-
ment by naming as defendants the officers of state
commissions. For example, in Frisby, plaintiff MCI
Telecommunications named as defendants the
five commissioners of the Public Service Commis-
sion of Maryland. 247
Plaintiffs then must allege that the state officer
is engaged in a violation of federal law. 248 Plain-
tiffs seeking to enforce the requirements of sec-
tions 251 and 252 fulfill this requirement by alleg-
ing that the state officers are violating or will
violate section 251 and/or section 252. For exam-
ple, in Frisby, plaintiff MCI Telecommunications
alleged that the five commissioners of the Public
Service Commission of Maryland adopted a rate
order in violation of section 252.249 Specifically,
MCI Telecommunications argued that the rate or-
der violated section 252(c) (4) (B) which "imposes
a duty on local carriers not to prohibit or place
unreasonable discriminatory conditions or limita-
tions on the resale of telecommunications serv-
ices" and section 252(d) (3) which "requires state
that Ex parte Young relief was not available because the state
commission had been dismissed from the suit and was a nec-
essary party. See infra note 264.
246 See supra Part V.A.
247 See Frisby, 998 F. Supp. at 625.
248 See supra Part V.A.
249 See Frisby, 998 F. Supp. at 627.
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commissions to determine wholesale rates on the
basis of retail minus avoidable costs."2
5
Finally, plaintiffs must allege that the violation
of federal law is ongoing2 5 1 This requirement can
be fulfilled by careful pleading. A plaintiff can
simply assert that it seeks to compel future com-
pliance with sections 251 and 252 rather than to
obtain redress for a prior violation. In Frisby,
plaintiff MCI Telecommunications simply indi-
cated that it was seeking only "prospective, injunc-
tive relief."25 2 The threat of future enforcement of
an unlawful interconnection order also provides a
foundation for requesting Ex parte Young relief.253
2. The Exception In Seminole Tribe Does Not
Preclude Ex Parte Young Relief So Long As The
FCC Does Not Issue An Order Preempting State
Commission Participation
In addressing whether the exception in Seminole
Tribe precludes Ex parte Young relief, the key ques-
tion is whether the relief that can be afforded
under sections 251 and 252 is more limited than
the relief that can be afforded under Ex parte
Young.2 54 As noted above, there are at least three
possible ways in which a statutory remedial
scheme may be detailed and therefore imply that
Congress intended to foreclose Ex pare Young re-
lief. 255
First, sections 251 and 252 may be detailed in
the sense that those sections limit the types of re-
lief that are available. 25" Quoting language in sec-
tion 252(e) (6), the court in AT&T Communica-
tions argued that the 1996 Act "specifically limits
the relief available in a federal district court to a
determination by the federal court that 'the
agreement or statement meets the requirements
of section 251 of this title and this section."' 2 57
The court in Wisconsin Bell I reached a similar con-
clusion stating that "Congress made a logical
250 Id. at 627.
251 See supra Part V.A.
252 Frisby, 998 F. Supp. at 629.
253 See Climax, 186 F. 3d 726 (6th Cir. 1999), opinion with-
drawn by court on Jan. 10, 2000; amended opinion reported at _
F.3d -, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 585, at *14 (Jan. 18, 2000).
254 See sura Part V.B.
255 See id.
256 See id.
257 AT&T Communications v. BellSouth, 43 F. Supp. 2d
593, 602 (M.D. La. 1999) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6)).
258 Wisconsin Bell 1, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
259 Id.
260 Seminole Tribe 517 U.S. at 74 (quoting the IGRA).
choice when it decided to limit the remedy within
the Telecommunications Act to having a [state]
commission's ruling tested in federal court" be-
cause "[s]uch limited review is adequate to cure
errors in federal law without subjecting state com-
missioners to the full remedial powers of a federal
district court."258 Furthermore, the court argued
that "[1]imited review keeps the number of liti-
gants to a minimum, which conserves judicial re-
sources."
259
This reasoning is flawed. Unlike the IGRA,
which limited the reviewing court's power to issu-
ing an "order directing the State and the Indian
tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days, 260
the 1996 Act does not specify any form of relief.
Section 252 (e) (6) provides federal court jurisdic-
tion "to determine whether the agreement or
statement meets the requirements of section 251
and [section 252]" merely to clarify that the court
is not to review state commission determinations
that are based on state law.26 1 Thus, sections 251
and 252 are silent as to the available remedial
powers of the federal courts. Accordingly, the reg-
ulatory scheme is not sufficiently detailed in this
respect to suggest that Congress intended to fore-
close the availability of Ex parte Young relief.
Second, sections 251 and 252 may be detailed
in the sense that those sections limit the types of
defendants who may be subject to suit.2 62 The
courts in both Frisby and AT&T Communications
advanced this proposition.2 63 However, sections
251 and 252 do not explicitly identify the proper
defendants to name in an action brought under
section 252(e) (6). Because of the 1996 Act's re-
peated references to state commissions, the state
commission is a logical state-party defendant.
However, it seems unreasonable to conclude from
this and nothing more that Congress intended an
action against the state commission to be the ex-
clusive remedy available.2 64 Moreover, the conclu-
261 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 126 (1996) (stating that
section 252(e) "preserves state authority to enforce state law
requirements in agreements approved under this section.").
262 See supra Part V.B.
263 See AT&T Communications v. BellSouth, 43 F. Supp. at
602; Frisby, 998 F. Supp. at 630.
264 The court in Wisconsin Bell H reached a very different
conclusion by framing the issue not in terms of the exception
in Seminole Tribe, but rather in terms of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See Wisconsin Bell II, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 710. In
Wisconsin Bell I, the court dismissed the state commission,
concluding that in light of MCI Telecommunications, Illinois Bell
and College Savings, the state sovereign immunity defense
could not be circumvented. See id. at 712-13. The court went
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sion that the legislative scheme is detailed in this
regard ignores the well-accepted underlying fic-
tion created by Ex parte Young. Although the
named defendants in an action under Ex parte
Young are state officers, the relief granted by a
court runs against the state. As demonstrated by
the existence of section 252(e) (6), Congress in-
tended the federal courts to have the power to
grant relief against the state and did not intend to
foreclose Ex pane Young relief.
Third, sections 251 and 252 may appear de-
tailed because those sections stipulate procedural
predicates to obtaining federal court review that
would not be applicable in an action brought
under Ex parte Young.265 However, the 1996 Act
imposes only one procedural predicate to judicial
review: the existence of an agreement that has
been approved or rejected by a state commis-
sion.266 The court in Frisby seems to suggest that a
suit brought under Ex pane Young would circum-
vent this procedural predicate, because the Ex
pane Young doctrine authorizes suits to review in-
termediate determinations made by the state com-
mission.2 67 However, the doctrine of Ex pane
Young does not circumvent the well established fi-
nality requirement or the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Thus, the fact that sec-
tion 252(e) (6) only may be invoked if an inter-
connection agreement has been approved or re-
jected by the state commission is fully consistent
with the remedial relief available under Ex parte
Young. Accordingly, the judicial review scheme is
not detailed in the sense of prescribing proce-
on to conclude MCI Telecommunications and Illinois Bell re-
quired the state commission to be a "party" or the court did
not have jurisdiction. The rationale behind this aspect of the
decision in Wisconsin Bell II is dubious to say the least.
The issue before the Seventh Circuit in MCI Telecommunica-
tions and Illinois Bell was not whether the state commission is
a "necessary party," but rather whether Congress intended
the state commission to be named as a defendant in an ac-
tion under section 252(e) (6). Although the Seventh Circuit
concluded in both cases that the state commission can and
should be named as a defendant in such actions, this conclu-
sion differs from holding that the state commission is a nec-
essary party in an action to enforce the requirements of sec-
tions 251 and 252. The court's decision in Wisconsin Bell II
also can be distinguished because it considered the unique
situation where both the state commission and the state com-
mission's officers had been dismissed. See Wisconsin Bell 1, 27
F. Supp. 2d at 1149-50 (dismissing the state commission's of-
ficers under the exception in Seminole Tribe).
265 See supra Part V.B text accompanying notes 227-244.
See also MCI v. Frisby, 998 F. Supp. at 629-30; Wisconsin Bell II,
57 F. Supp. 2d at 712-13.
dural predicates to the availability of judicial re-
view.
Additionally, it should be noted that the deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe does not clearly indicate that
the existence of specialized procedural predicates
to litigation necessarily precludes Ex pane Young
relief. As noted in Part V.B, the Court's discussion
of Ex pane Young does not explicitly cite the proce-
dural predicates found under the IGRA. Indeed,
even if procedural predicates are a relevant factor,
Ex parte Young suits arguably would be foreclosed
in only those situations where those procedural
predicates are not fulfilled. Indeed, the outcome
in Frisby is consistent with this proposition because
the plaintiffs in that case were seeking review of
the state commission's determinations prior to
the formation of an agreement approved or re-
jected by the state commission.
Thus, at least initially, the Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe does not foreclose Ex pane Young re-
lief. However, there is an important caveat. As dis-
cussed in Part IV.B.3, upon a final order dis-
missing the state commission, the FCC is subject
to an express statutory duty to "issue an order pre-
empting the State commission's jurisdiction of
that proceeding or matter within 90 days after be-
ing notified (or taking notice) of such failure."2 68
The FCC then is required to "assume the respon-
sibility of the State commission ... with respect to
the proceeding or matter and act for the State
commission. '" 269 Section 252(e) (6) provides that
"the proceeding by the [FCC] and any judicial re-
view of the [FCC's] actions shall be the exclusive
266 See supra Part ll.B.
267 Specifically, the court in Frisby stated the following:
This Court finds that Congress intended § 251 (c) (4) (B)
and § 252(d) (3) (the sections MCI asserts are violated by
the Rate Order) to be enforced against the state only in
an action brought tinder § 252(e)(6), not through an
action based on Ex parte Young. Sections 251 and 252 of
the Act were written with a view toward ultimate agree-
ments between local and non-local carriers. The Act is
an extremely complex, omnibus piece of legislation en-
acted after vigorous debate. The sections involved here
are closely intertwined, and it is inconceivable to this
Court that Congress intended that the sections be
ripped out of the context of the agreements that these
sections contemplate, for purposes of judicial review.
Furthermore, Congress provided an express remedy
against a State commission in federal court to enforce
compliance with §§ 251 and 252, and a prerequisite of
that express remedy is an interconnection agreement.
MCI v. Frisby, 998 F. Supp. at 630.
268 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6).
269 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6).
[Vol. 8
Judicial Review of Interconnection Agreements
remedies for a State commission's failure to
act."270 Because Congress clearly intended for this
to be the "exclusive" remedy available to plaintiffs
once the FCC issues its order, the Court's decision
in Seminole Tribe instructs that Ex pane Young relief
against the officers of the state commission ceases
to be available. Indeed, Ex parte Young relief may
be unnecessary. Once the state commission is pre-
empted, it has no legal authority in connection
with the matter. Accordingly, it should be unnec-
essary to enjoin the state commission.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion on the applicability of
the doctrines of abrogation, waiver and Ex parte
Young reveals a simple and straightforward per-
spective on how litigation to enforce the require-
ments of sections 251 and 252 of the Communica-
tions Act should proceed.
In a typical action, the plaintiff names as de-
fendants both the state commission and its of-
ficers. 27 1 Indeed, a plaintiff would be remiss not
to name both classes of defendants in light of sec-
tion 252(e) (6) and the availability of the state sov-
ereign immunity defense. 27 2
If the state commission chooses to invoke the
state sovereign immunity defense, it should be dis-
missed from the suit. In light of Seminole Tribe, the
abrogation doctrine is not a viable mechanism for
circumventing the defense because Congress can-
not abrogate state sovereign immunity by exercis-
ing its Interstate Commerce power and did not
adopt section 252 pursuant to its powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 73 Fur-
thermore, the waiver doctrine is not a viable
mechanism for circumventing the state sovereign
immunity defense because state commissions do
not expressly waive their immunity. Nor can the
plaintiff argue in light of the Court's decision in
College Savings that the state commission construc-
tively waives its immunity by participating under
sections 251 and 252. Even assuming for the sake
270 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (emphasis added). See also
supra Part V and text accompanying notes 213-244.
271 See Wisconsin Bell 1!, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 715-16.
272 On one hand, if the state commission invokes state
sovereign immunity, the plaintiff will want to obtain relief
against the state commission's officers under Ex parte Young.
On the other hand, if the state commission chooses not to
invoke state sovereign immunity, the plaintiff will want to
proceed against the state commission under section
of argument that some remnant of the construc-
tive waiver doctrine survives College Savings, the
waiver argument is not valid because there is in-
sufficient justification for a court to conclude that
Congress intended to make waiver a condition of
state commission participation under sections
251/252.
Although the state commission can obtain dis-
missal, injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex
parte Young is available against the state commis-
sion's officers. At this stage, the Court's decision
in Seminole Tribe does not foreclose Ex parte Young
relief because the 1996 Act does not evince Con-
gress's intent to limit the availability of such relief.
Matters change, however, once the state com-
mission has been dismissed. Upon a final order of
dismissal, the state commission has "failed to act
to carry out its responsibility" under section
252.274 Thus, dismissal triggers the FCC's express
statutory duty to "issue an order preempting the
State commission's jurisdiction of that proceeding
or matter within 90 days after being notified (or
taking notice) of such failure."2 75 Upon issuing
the order, the FCC is required to "assume the re-
sponsibility of the State commission . . .with re-
spect to the proceeding or matter and act for the
State commission. '" 276
Once a preemption order is issued, Ex pante
Young relief is no longer available. Section
252(e) (6) states "the proceeding by the [FCC]
and any judicial review of the [FCC's] actions
shall be the exclusive remedies for a State commis-
sion's failure to act. '2 77 The Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe instructs that where Congress has es-
tablished a detailed remedial scheme, such as by
clearly stating that the plaintiff's exclusive reme-
dies shall be a proceeding by the FCC and judicial
review of the FCC's actions, Ex pate Young relief is
foreclosed.
Although this much of the framework under
sections 251 and 252 seems clear, an aggrieved
party seeking preemption faces additional ques-
tions. What is the scope of the FCC's preemption
252(e) (6). Because the plaintiff has no way of knowing at the
onset of litigation whether the state commission will invoke
the defense, the plaintiff should name both classes of defend-
ants.
273 See also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 65-66.
274 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (5).
275 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (6).
276 47 U.S.C.§ 252(e) (6).
277 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (5) (emphasis added).
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order?278 What role does the FCC assume once it
preempts the state commission?279 What happens
if the FCC ignores its statutory duty and refuses to
issue a preemption order?
To eliminate the uncertainty surrounding these
questions, the FCC should amend its rules to ex-
plicitly provide that it shall preempt any state
commission that successfully invokes the state sov-
ereign immunity defense. Such a rule might deter
state commissions from invoking the defense and
278 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 51.805 (1998) (discussing scope
of preemption).
279 The FCC's rules provide that "[a]t a minimum, the
[FCC] shall approve or reject any interconnection agree-
ment adopted by negotiation, mediation or arbitration for
which the [FCC], pursuant to section 252 (e) (5) of the [Com-
munications] Act, has assumed the state commission's re-
sponsibilities." 47 C.F.R. § 51.805(a) (1998). See also 47 C.F.R.
§ 51.807 (1998) (discussing arbitration and mediation of
agreements by the FCC pursuant to section 252(e) (5)).
would at the very least simplify the process of pre-
emption. However, at this time, unless the FCC
chooses to "take notice upon its own motion that
a state commission has failed to act," the ag-
grieved party is required to file with the FCC a pe-
tition seeking preemption. 20 Such a petition inva-
riably will raise regulatory and policy
considerations closely intertwined with the analy-
sis presented in this article. 28 1
280 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.803 (1998) (outlining filing and
processing procedures). Note that "[t]he party seeking pre-
emption must prove that the state has failed to act to carry
out its responsibilities under section 252 of the [Communica-
tions] Act." 47 C.F.R. § 51.803(b) (1998).
281 At the time this article went to press, the FCC had yet
to consider a preemption petition premised upon a state
commission's invocation of its sovereign immunity, and thus
such a petition would be a case of first impression.
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